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X-WR-CALDESC:Évènements pour BxSE
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TZID:Europe/Paris
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231205T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231205T131500
DTSTAMP:20231127T180303Z
CREATED:20230713T122703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231127T180303Z
UID:19104-1701777600-1701782100@www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr
SUMMARY:Séminaire: Renaud Coulomb  (Mines Paris - PSL Univ.)
DESCRIPTION:Agenda > Tous les événements\nSéminaire d’économie de Bordeaux\n \n \nRenaud Coulomb\n(Mines Paris – PSL University (CERNA)) \n  \n’Bad’ Oil\,’Worse’ Oil and Carbon Misallocation\nAbstract: Not all barrels of oil are created equal: their extraction varies in both private cost and carbon intensity. Using a rich micro-dataset on World oil fields and estimates of their carbon intensities and private extraction costs\, this paper quantifies the additional emissions and costs from having extracted the ’wrong’ deposits. We do so by comparing historical deposit-level supplies to counterfactuals that factor in pollution costs\, while keeping annual global consumption unchanged. Between 1992 and 2018\, carbon misallocation amounted to at least 11.00 GtCO2eq with an environmental cost evaluated at US$ 2.2 trillion (US$ 2018). This translates into a significant supply-side ecological debt for major producers of dirty oil. Looking towards the future\, we estimate the gains from making deposit-level extraction socially optimal at about 9.30 GtCO2eq evaluated at US$ 1.9 trillion (US$ 2018) along a future aggregate demand pathway coherent with the objective of net-zero emissions in 2050\, and document the very unequal distribution of the subsequent stranded oil reserves across countries. \n  \n– Séminaire organisé par le programme 3 / BSE –\n \n  \n>> Pour assister au séminaire via ZOOM\, contacter julie.vissaguet@u-bordeaux.fr \n \n \n  \n 
URL:https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/agenda/seminaire-renaud-coulomb-mines-paris-psl-univ/
LOCATION:BxSE\, salle de séminaire H2-116\, bât.H\, campus Pessac\, avenue Leon Duguit\, Pessac\, 33600
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231208T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231208T111500
DTSTAMP:20231127T180818Z
CREATED:20231127T180818Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231127T180818Z
UID:20105-1702029600-1702034100@www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr
SUMMARY:Séminaire: Michael Grimm  (University of Passau)
DESCRIPTION:Agenda > Tous les événements\nSéminaire (programme 3 – BSE)\n  \nMichael Grimm \n(University of Passau) \n  \nSupporting small firms in a fragile context: Comparing matching and cash grants in Burkina Faso\n  \nAbstract: We used a randomized trial to compare matching grants earmarked for business development services with more flexible cash grants and with no support. The experiment was implemented in a fragile setting where subsidizing innovative activities might be particularly important. Firms were selected on the basis of a business plan competition. All firms were operating in sectors related to agriculture. After two years\, beneficiaries of cash grants were clearly performing better than beneficiaries of matching grants and firms in the control group\, and were more resilient to the COVID-19 crisis. However\, even for beneficiaries of cash\, improvements were limited to investment\, business practices\, innovation skills\, and survival\, with no transformative effects on profits and employment\, except for firms in industry and services. Beneficiaries of matching grants showed improved management practices and somewhat higher innovation skills\, but complained about complex procurement. Implementation costs were 25% higher for matching than for cash grants. \n  \n– Séminaire organisé par le programme 3 / BSE –\n \n \n \n  \n 
URL:https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/agenda/seminaire-michael-grimm-university-of-passau/
LOCATION:BxSE\, salle de séminaire H2-116\, bât.H\, campus Pessac\, avenue Leon Duguit\, Pessac\, 33600
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231214T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231214T120000
DTSTAMP:20231201T171542Z
CREATED:20231127T185655Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231201T171542Z
UID:20109-1702549800-1702555200@www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr
SUMMARY:Séminaire: Josselin Thuilliez (CNRS-Univ. Rennes\, CREM)
DESCRIPTION:Agenda > Tous les événements\nSéminaire d’économie de Bordeaux\n  \n\n \n\nJosselin Thuilliez\n(CNRS-University of Rennes\, CREM\, UMR 6211) \n  \n\nIneffective Reminders?\nIn the short term\, reminders are considered highly effective in improving various preventive health behaviors\, characterized by an immediate action cost for delayed benefits. However\, the long-term effects and optimal frequency remain uncertain. We propose a very simple model in which the marginal return of an additional reminder decreases\, while fatigue increases over time and with the number of reminders. The race between costly cumulative efforts and the informational and attentional benefits of reminders determines individuals’ protection levels in the short and long run. In the short term\, increased prevention use is favored by a higher marginal return of information compared to its cost\, while in the long term\, the rise in fatigue due to this information leads to a decrease in its usage. We next focus on insecticide-treated bednets to prevent malaria\, a technology that is highly effective when widely adopted and generates positive health externalities. We combine surveys\, unique high-frequency data on net usage with a randomized experiment using generic and specific reminders.  We find that while malaria targeted messages are effective in the short term\, they have little effect in the long term. Moreover\, the higher the frequency\, the less effective the reminders are. \n  \n\n– Séminaire organisé par le programme 3 / BSE –\n \n  \n>> pour assister au séminaire via Zoom\, contacter julie.vissaguet@u-bordeaux.fr \n \n \n  \n 
URL:https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/agenda/seminaire-josselin-thuilliez-cnrs-univ-rennes-crem/
LOCATION:BxSE\, salle de séminaire H2-116\, bât.H\, campus Pessac\, avenue Leon Duguit\, Pessac\, 33600
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231219T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20231219T131500
DTSTAMP:20231127T184513Z
CREATED:20231127T184513Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231127T184513Z
UID:20107-1702987200-1702991700@www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr
SUMMARY:Séminaire: Abel François (U. Strasbourg) & Sophie Panel (Sciences Po Grenoble)
DESCRIPTION:Agenda > Tous les événements\nSéminaire d’économie de Bordeaux\n  \nAbel François\n(EM Strasbourg Business School\, Université de Strasbourg) \nSophie Panel\n(Sciences Po Grenoble\, Université Grenoble Alpes\, CESICE) \n  \nInternational aid is sensitive to dictators’ facial competence!\nAbstract: Previous research shows that aid donors react to the quality of governance in recipient countries: they tend to avoid countries with poor institutions\, where aid is more likely to be misused. In non-democratic countries\, however\, successful aid implementation depends not only on the quality of institutions but also on the characteristics of political leaders. In this paper\, we test the hypothesis that donors rely in part on the impressions conveyed by dictators’ faces to assess their propensity to divert or otherwise misuse foreign aid. In particular\, we test whether non-democratic countries receive more aid when they are ruled by a dictator who looks either competent or trustworthy. We analyse the relationship between facial impressions and foreign aid on a sample of about 100 non-democratic countries observed over the period 1975-2010. Impressions of competence and trustworthiness were collected using a computer-based survey in which we asked anonymous respondents to rate pictures of 274 non-democratic leaders on competence and trustworthiness. We draw three main conclusions. First\, competent looking dictators attract more foreign aid\, but we do not find a similar relationship between aid and perceived trustworthiness. Second\, the relationship between facial impressions and aid is stronger for general budget support than for targeted aid\, and for cash aid than for aid in kind: these patterns suggest that donors attach more importance to the competence of the recipient when aid is easier to divert. Third\, two-part models suggest that the probability of receiving aid\, but not the amount of aid received\, is sensitive to dictators’ facial competence. \n  \n  \n– Séminaire organisé par le programme 3 / BSE –\n \n  \n>> pour assister au séminaire via Zoom\, contacter julie.vissaguet@u-bordeaux.fr \n \n \n  \n 
URL:https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/agenda/seminaire-abel-francois-u-strasbourg-sophie-panel-sciences-po-grenoble/
LOCATION:BxSE\, salle de séminaire H2-116\, bât.H\, campus Pessac\, avenue Leon Duguit\, Pessac\, 33600
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