Séminaire d’économie de Bordeaux

Laurent Mathevet

University of Arizona

Information Design: Foundations & Reputation

In information design, a sender commits to sending costless signals to one or many receivers as a function of information the sender will learn. In this way the sender may influence the receivers in their actions. The commitment assumption differentiates this information design exercise from the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel (1982)), allowing the sender to achieve a higher optimal value and theorists to provide powerful characterizations. However, such commitment is often difficult to justify in practice, due to interim incentives to deviate. Can reputation replace legal commitment for an institution making periodic announcements? Near the limiting case of ideal patience, existing results imply a positive answer in value terms. We provide a positive answer in terms of behavior as well, offering stronger foundations for the information design framework.

>> salle H1-102 (bat H1, 1er étage) <<

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